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The early 1980s marked the onset of two striking features of the current world macro-economy: the
fall in US business cycle volatility (the "great moderation") and the large and persistent US external
imbalance. In this paper we argue that an external imbalance is a natural consequence of the great
moderation. If a country experiences a fall in volatility greater than that of its partners, its relative
incentives to accumulate precautionary savings fall and this results in an equilibrium  permanent deterioration
of its external balance. To assess how much of the current US imbalance can be explained by this channel,
we consider a standard two country business cycle model in which households are subject to country
specific shocks they cannot perfectly insure against. The model suggests that a fall in business cycle
volatility like the one observed for the US relatively to other major economies can account for about
20% of the current total US external imbalance.
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One of the most striking features of the US economy over the last twenty years has
been a large reduction in business cycle volatility. This phenomenon, also known as
the “great moderation”, has been the topic of a large and growing debate among
economists and policy-makers, which has focused mostly on explaining why it has
occurred.1 Most studies conclude that a signiﬁcant part of the observed decline
in macroeconomic volatility has been driven by a reduction in the volatility of the
underlying macro shocks hitting the economy. This ﬁnding constitutes the starting
point of our paper, which asks whether and to what extent the great moderation can
explain another important phenomenon that has characterized the US economy in
the last two decades, namely the large and persistent US external imbalance. The
reason why we think there is such a connection is both empirical and theoretical.
Empirically, many researchers date the onset of the great moderation around 1983-
1984 (see for example Stock and Watson, 2003); interestingly, just around that time
the current US external balance begun to deteriorate.
Theoretically, in a world in which country speciﬁc shocks cannot be perfectly in-
sured, the equilibrium external balance of a country is aﬀected by, among many other
factors, the strength of its precautionary saving motive relative to that of its partners.
This, in turn, is aﬀected by the relative volatility of the shocks faced by the country.
As the relative volatility of the shocks falls, a country faces less risk vis-` a-vis its part-
ners and, as a consequence, its precautionary motive is weakened and the component
of its external assets accumulated for self insurance purposes falls. We develop this
idea using a standard two country business cycle model with investment, in which
the only internationally traded asset is a single non contingent bond. Moreover, each
country faces a ﬁxed limit on its international borrowing. In this framework country
speciﬁc shocks cannot be perfectly insured, there is an explicit precautionary mo-
tive to save and we can numerically characterize the mapping between the relative
volatility of the shocks hitting the two economies and the external balance of the
two countries. We then use this mapping to quantitatively assess how much of the
observed deterioration of the US net foreign asset position can be explained by the
1A partial list of the relevant literature includes McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard
and Simon (2001), Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2002), Leduc and Sill (2003), Stock and Watson
(2003), Bernanke (2004) and Arias, Hansen and Ohanian (2006).
1reduction in the volatility of the US shocks. We ﬁnd that, with reasonable param-
eterizations of the model, the great moderation can generate an external imbalance
which is about 4.5% of GDP 25 years after its onset and reaches 7% of GDP in the
long run. Actual US imbalances are quite larger than these numbers, nevertheless the
imbalances explained by the great moderation are non-trivial and account for about
20% of the observed ones.
This paper contributes to the recent literature which attempts to assess the sustain-
ability and the evolution of the current US imbalances (see for example Backus et
al. 2006 , Edwards, 2005 or Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2005). Our contribution to this
literature is that at least a part of the US imbalances are due to the eﬃcient market
response to an underlying structural change in the world economy and that, regard-
ing that portion, we should not expect any sudden adjustment. Two recent papers
also reach a similar conclusion. One is by Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas (2006)
who argues that part of the recent US imbalances can be explained by the diﬀerent
growth experiences of US, Japan, Europe and Emerging Markets. Another is by Men-
doza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2006) who argue that US imbalances can be explained
by the fact that the United States experienced a faster process of internal ﬁnancial
liberalization than the rest of the world.
Our work is also related to the research that studies the importance of precau-
tionary saving in incomplete markets (see for example Ayiagari, 1995). These studies
typically ﬁnd that in a closed economy aggregate precautionary saving is quantita-
tively small because of general equilibrium eﬀects. The higher the risk a country faces
the larger the precautionary balance it will want to hold. However, as these balances
increase returns to capital fall, curtailing the equilibrium amount of precautionary
saving. Our study instead focuses on an open economy, so in a given country these
general equilibrium eﬀects are smaller and precautionary saving can become larger.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some evidence relevant to
our hypothesis. Section 3 presents the model. In section 4 we describe the experiment,
discuss parameter values and present results. Section 5 concludes.
22 Data
In this section we document some facts that are central to the hypothesis of this
paper. First, we show that among large developed economies (US, Japan and the Eu-
ropean Union, henceforth the G3) US has displayed the largest reduction in business
cycles volatility; in other words, although the “moderation” has a been a world-wide
phenomenon, only US has experienced a “great” one. Second, we document that
the onset of the great moderation in the US has coincided with the beginning of the
recent deterioration in the US net foreign asset position.
2.1 Business cycle volatility in the G3 Economies
Figure 1 reports several commonly used measures of business cycle ﬂuctuations for
the G3 economies for the period starting in the ﬁrst quarter of 1960 and ending the
last quarter of 2005. All data are from the OECD Quarterly National Accounts.
The panels in the ﬁrst column (labeled growth rates) report the series for the
quarterly log real GDP detrended using ﬁrst diﬀerences, which emphasize very short
term ﬂuctuations. The panels in the second column (labeled HP) report log real GDP
detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 1600; this
detrending method isolates cycles shorter than 32 quarters. The third and fourth
columns report the same variable detrended using high-pass ﬁlters which exclude
cycles longer than 60 (labeled HP60) and 80 quarters (labeled HP80), respectively.
These high pass ﬁlters include the so called “medium run cycles” which contain a
signiﬁcant fraction of GDP cyclical variation (see for example Comin and Gertler,
2005) and thus of country speciﬁc risk. The panels clearly show the onset of the
US great moderation around 1984 and show that the decline in the US business
cycle volatility appears at several diﬀerent frequencies. From ﬁgure 1 it also emerges
that, as noted for example by Stock and Watson (2005), a decline in business cycles
volatility occurred in Japan and in the European Union too, although its magnitude
is not as large or as uniform across frequencies as in the US.
To get a better sense of the magnitude of the reduction in volatility, Table 1
below reports the percentage standard deviations of the series in ﬁgure 1 for the pre































































































































Figure 1: Business cycles in the G3 economies
4in volatility across periods.2 The key message of the table is that the US, regardless of
the frequency, is the country which has experienced the largest reduction in volatility.
Note for example how, in the European Union, high and medium run business cycle
volatility, as captured by the HP80 ﬁlter, has actually slightly increased.
2In the table we use the same sample split for all 3 countries. Results are very similar when we
experiment with diﬀerent sample splits.
5Table 1. Changes in volatility of Real GDP cycles in the G3
Percentage Standard Deviation
Filter Country 1960.1-1983.4 1984.1-2005.4 Change
Growth rate US 1.08 0.51 -0.57
Japan 1.25 0.78 -0.47
EU 0.77 0.42 -0.35
HP US 1.90 0.96 -0.94
Japan 1.68 1.12 -0.56
EU 1.08 0.73 -0.35
HP60 US 2.84 1.32 -1.52
Japan 2.42 1.56 -0.86
EU 1.61 1.31 -0.30
HP80 US 3.15 2.05 -1.10
Japan 3.13 2.35 -0.88
EU 1.58 1.84 +0.26
2.2 The great moderation and US external imbalances
Figure 2 provides some evidence on the timing of the great moderation and the onset
of US external imbalances.
The left panel reports estimates of the instantaneous conditional US business
cycle volatility obtained ﬁtting a simple GARCH model on the time series for US
real GDP. Consistently with the previous literature the panel shows a sharp fall of
volatility estimates around 1983-1984.3 The right panel shows how the US external
imbalance started to appear just around that time (data on the US net foreign asset
position are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006). Obviously this might purely a
coincidence and these facts might be completely unrelated; or it might be the case
3We specify the GARCH model as
yt = β0 + β1yt−1 + εt
σ2
εt = β2 + β3ε2
t−1 + β4σ2
εt−1
where yt is the log of US real GDP, εt is a normal random variable with time varying variance σ2
εt
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Figure 2: US Business cycle volatility and external imbalances
that some fundamental change in the US or the world economy is responsible for
both these phenomena. In this paper we will not explore these possibilities but we
will take the decline in volatility as exogenously given and ask how much of the
growing external imbalances it can explain. We will do so in the next section with
the help of a standard general equilibrium model.
3 The model
We consider a version of the standard one-good two-country business cycle model of
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992). One additional assumption we make, relative
to the standard model, is that we restrict international asset trade to a single uncon-
tingent bond, as in Baxter and Crucini (1995), and we impose limits on borrowing.
In the model agents face country speciﬁc shocks and use international borrowing and
lending both for smoothing consumption and for allocating investment eﬃciently. The
presence of borrowing limits, together with the persistence of business cycles shocks,
makes it hard to perfectly insure country speciﬁc shocks and this lack of insurance
generates a precautionary saving motive, which is essential for understanding the
relation between external imbalances and country speciﬁc shock volatilities.
7The world economy consists of two countries, i = 1,2, each inhabited by a large
number of inﬁnitely-lived consumers and endowed with a constant returns to scale
production technology operated by competitive ﬁrms. Time is discrete and each
period is a quarter. Throughout the rest of the paper we will refer to US as country
1. The countries produce a single good, and their preferences and technology have the
same structure and parameter values. Although the technologies have the same form,
they diﬀer in two important respects: in each country, the labor input consists only
of domestic labor, and production is subject to country-speciﬁc technology shocks.
In each period t, the economy experiences one of ﬁnitely many events st. We
denote by st = (s0,...,st) the history of events up through and including period t.
The probability, as of period zero, of any particular history st is π(st). We assume
that idiosyncratic risk within each country is perfectly insured among residents so we










where ci(st) denotes consumption of the representative consumer in country i after
history st, U(c) = c1−γ
1−γ , γ > 0 is a positive parameter determining risk aversion and
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of representative consumers in both countries
and β > 0 is a positive parameter capturing their rate of time preference. The
representative agents in the two countries are endowed with one unit of labor which
they supply inelastically to domestic ﬁrms4, own domestic capital which they rent to
domestic ﬁrms, trade internationally an uncontingent default-free bond and choose
consumption and investment in each state of the world to maximize their expected










and capital accumulation constraints:
ki(s









for every st−1 and st. Here wi(st) and ri(st) are the wage and rental rate on capital
4The assumption of inelastic labor supply is not essential for our purposes.
8in country i, δ is the depreciation rate of capital, xi(st) is investment in country i, φ
is a parameter that determines the magnitude of capital adjustment costs, R(st−1) is
the gross interest rate on uncontingent borrowing and lending between period t − 1
and period t, bi(st) denotes the quantity of uncontingent bonds purchased at t by
a consumer in country i. An important assumption of the model is that countries
face ﬁxed limits to their international borrowing. Without these limits the single
bond traded in this economy would allow agents to insure very well against country
speciﬁc shocks (as noted by Baxter and Crucini, 1995) and so the precautionary saving
motive, which is crucial for generating the persistence of the external imbalance,
would disappear. We assume that constraints on international borrowing have the
form
bi(st)
yi(st) ≥ −¯ b, where ¯ b is some positive number and yi(st) is aggregate output in
country i.
Finally, competitive ﬁrms hire capital and labor to operate a Cobb-Douglas tech-















where α is a constant parameter and Ai(st) is a country-speciﬁc total factor pro-
ductivity shock which follows an exogenous process. Note that aggregate output in
country i at st, denoted by yi(st), can be written as a function of domestic labor
supply li(st) and capital stock installed in country i in the previous period ki(st−1).








An equilibrium for this economy is deﬁned as a collection of mappings for prices
wi(st),ri(st),R(st), exogenous processes Ai(st) and quantities ci(st),xi(st),ki(st),bi(st)
such that, when consumers and ﬁrms take prices and exogenous processes as given,
the quantities solve their optimization problems and such that the markets for con-
sumption/investment goods, capital, labor and bonds clear in each country, in each
date t and in each state st.
94 The experiment
We will now use the model just described as a measuring tool to quantify the size and
the persistence of the imbalances generated by a country speciﬁc reduction in business
cycles volatility, as the one experienced by the US and documented in section 2. In
order to do so, we ﬁrst compute equilibria in a completely symmetric world, in which
both countries face the same constant volatility of shocks. We then assume that at
a given point in time along this equilibrium path, the volatility of US shocks falls to
a new constant level and that agents in both countries learn about this change in-
stantaneously. We ﬁnally evaluate the expected responses of selected macro variables
to this change. Summarizing, we will be computing impulse responses to a change
in second moments, as opposed to traditional impulse responses to changes in ﬁrst
moments. To perform this experiment, we will ﬁrst choose parameter values and then
characterize the numerical solution of the model.
4.1 Parameters and computation
We need to set values for the preference parameters β and γ, for the technology
parameters α, δ and φ and for the borrowing constraint ¯ b. We also need to specify
an exogenous process for the TFP shocks Ai(st). The discount factor β, the capital
depreciation rate δ, the share of capital in production α and the capital adjustment
costs φ are set so that a symmetric equilibrium in the model (i.e. an equilibrium
in which both countries face equally volatile shocks) displays an average return to
capital of 4%, a yearly average capital to GDP ratio of 2.5, an average share of
GDP going to capital equal to 36% and investment series which is 3 times as volatile
as the GDP series.5 These values are typical for the US and other major world
economies and the structure of the model allow us to easily and precisely identify
the parameters. The risk aversion γ and the borrowing constraint parameter ¯ b are
important for our analysis but there is no obvious data which allow us to precisely
identify them. In our benchmark parametrization we set the risk aversion to 5,
which is in between the value typically used in macro studies (which use numbers
5Note that due the precautionary saving motive in this economy the long run averages of variables
are in general diﬀerent from the value of the variables in the deterministic steady state. For example,
for our benchmark parameterization, long run average capital is about 1.7% higher than capital in
the deterministic steady state.
10around 2) and ﬁnance studies (which usually set it to values of 10 or higher). We
also limit international borrowing to be less than 100% of GDP. In the sensitivity
analysis section below we experiment with diﬀerent values both for the risk aversion
and for limits to international borrowing. The last important input of the model is
the stochastic process for TFP shocks. In this class of models it is common to specify



















where ρ and ψ are ﬁxed parameters and εi(st), are jointly normal shocks with
zero mean, variance σ2
ε and correlation coeﬃcient η, and the term M(t) is a declining
function of time that captures the reduction in business cycles volatility. Note that
we model the great moderation as a reduction in volatility in US (country 1) business
cycles only and that we keep business cycles volatility in the other country (the
rest of the world) constant. In reality, volatility fell also in other countries, but our
assumption captures in a simple way the fact, documented in table 1, that in the US
the reduction in business cycle volatility has been larger than in other countries.
In the model these shocks are the drivers of business cycles ﬂuctuations including
the medium run ones, so we pick the parameters of the process to match statistics for
log GDP ﬁltered with a high pass ﬁlter (the series labeled HP80 in table 1 above).





if t < 1984
if t ≥ 1984
where 0 < 1−λ < 1 ; then choose σ and ρ to match the persistence and the volatility
of HP80 log GDP in the US in the pre-moderation period. Note that the degree
of persistence of the shocks is a key parameter as it determines the strength of the
precautionary saving motive, so in the sensitivity analysis section we will experiment
with diﬀerent values for ρ. The parameter λ aﬀects the decline of the ratio of US
volatility to foreign volatility. Table 1 reveals that, for HP80 GDP, the ratio fell by
about 15% for US versus Japan and by 79% for US relative to the European Union.
As a conservative estimate, we set λ so to match a decline of 33%, but we experiment
11with diﬀerent values.6 Our results are not very sensitive to the parameters ψ and η
which determine the structure of business cycle co-movement between countries. We
simply set ψ = 0 and η = 0.4 so that the model reproduces the co-movement of HP80
GDP between US, the European Union and Japan in the 1960-2005 period.7
For computational reasons we transform the process (2) into a 9 states Markov
chain; the parameters of the states and transition probability matrix of the Markov
chain are estimated on simulated data from (2), by a combination of maximum like-
lihood and method of moments.8 Table 2 summarizes our benchmark choices of
parameter values.
Table 2. Benchmark Parameter Values
Name Symbol Value
Preferences and Technology
Discount Factor β 0.9895
Risk Aversion γ 5
Capital share α 0.36
Depreciation rate δ 0.0255
Capital Adjustment Cost φ 0.2




Standard deviation σε 0.0075
Standard deviation ratio decline λ 0.33
Correlation η 0.4
Note ﬁnally that, since we are interested in capturing the eﬀect of changes in
volatilities, we cannot numerically compute equilibria of this model using lineariza-
tion based methods, as, in such methods, individuals’ and ﬁrms’ decision rules are
independent from second moments of the shocks. We instead compute decision rules
6The parameter λ also aﬀects the post-1984 population mean of productivity shocks in US. In
order to abstract from this eﬀect in all our experiments we rescale the post-1984 US productivity
shocks so that their population mean is equal to the pre-1984 mean.
7Although there is some evidence that cross country business cycle correlation has actually de-
clined through time (see Heathcote and Perri, 2004) in this experiment we keep it ﬁxed to focus on
the eﬀects of the decline in volatility.
8Details of the estimation procedure together with the states and the transition probabilities of
the Markov chain are available upon request.
12using a global solution method that is designed to generate close approximations to
true equilibrium allocations across a large portion of the state space; in particular
we solve the model by approximating policy functions for consumption ci(st), invest-
ment xi(st), bond purchases bi(st) and price functions wi(st) ri(st),R(st) as piecewise
bi-linear functions deﬁned over a state space which consists of productivities Ai(st),
installed capital ki(st−1) and bond holdings bi(st−1).
4.2 Main results
Figure 3 shows the 60 years expected responses of key variables to a reduction in
US volatility. As we discussed in the previous section, we assume that in the ﬁrst
quarter of 1984 the standard deviation of the innovations of US productivity shocks
unexpectedly falls by 33% and then it stays constant at the new lower level for ever.9
Panels 1 and 2 contain our key results and show that, in response to a reduction
in the shocks volatility, US expects (averaging across possible shock realizations)
a persistent negative net foreign asset position, which reaches, 25 years after the
volatility reduction, about 4.5% of GDP. Panel 2 in ﬁgure 2 suggests that the current
US imbalances are about 24% of GDP, so our proposed channel could explain about
20% of the current total US external debt. Keep in mind, however, that the net
foreign asset position in ﬁgure 2 includes also position with developing countries
(such as China) and oil exporting countries which are not explicitly modeled here. If
one focuses only on the US external debt with Japan and the European Union, our
estimate of the imbalance in 2004 is about 12% of GDP, suggesting that our story
could explain around one third of the external imbalances of US with other developed
economies.10 Note ﬁnally that the external imbalance increase rapidly initially but
9The responses displayed in the ﬁgures are averages over a large number of model simulations.
In each simulation we start with both countries with identical shocks and with identical capital
stock equal to the deterministic steady state. We then simulate both economies for 300 periods with
shocks having equal variance (so the average capital stock reaches its long run value) and in period
300 (which in panels 1 through 6 corresponds to the ﬁrst quarter of 1984) we reduce the variance of
the US shocks.
10In order to compute the foreign asset position of US with Japan and the European Union only,
one needs data on bilateral net foreign asset positions which are not readily available in standard
data sources for all types of assets. We estimated that position to be 12% by ﬁrst computing the US
net foreign asset position vis-` a-vis the European Union and Japan for securities only (including debt
and equity) derived using data from the Treasury International Capital (TIC) reporting system. We
then assumed that the ratio of the US net foreign asset position vis-` a-vis the rest of the world to
the US foreign asset position vis-` a-vis Europe and Japan, is the same when calculated for all assets
13then stabilizes. By year 2100 (not shown in the graph) the expected imbalance is
constant at a level of 7% of GDP.
In order to understand the dynamics leading to the imbalance, in panels 3 through
6 we report the expected paths of investment, capital stock, consumption and real
interest rate. Since US consumers hold all claims to US GDP, a fall in US GDP
volatility diminishes their risk and their precautionary saving motive. This eﬀect
makes them more “impatient” as they prefer current over future consumption. This
preference is reﬂected in the declining path of US consumption.(see panel 5). How do
US consumers obtain higher current consumption in exchange for future consumption?
There are two ways they can do it: one is by reducing capital stock, the other is by
borrowing on international markets. Because of the presence of adjustment costs, the
reduction of the capital stock is implemented only gradually, so initially US consumers
will borrow heavily on international markets (see panels 1 and 2 which show that, for
the ﬁrst 20 years after the shocks, the current account balance remains low and the net
foreign asset position declines rapidly). This drives up the international interest rate
R(st) and this increase makes investment and capital stock fall in the foreign country
as well.11 In other words, foreigners substitute domestic capital with international
bonds as international bonds now pay a higher interest rate. Over time the fall in
US capital stock and US foreign assets increases the exposure of US consumers to
risk and thus reduces their “impatience” ; as a consequence their demand for current
consumption falls, they are able to ﬁnance their consumption path simply from the
reduction in investment and they no longer need to use international markets. In
panel 3 observe that around year 2020 the current account deﬁcit is negligible. This
also stops the upward pressure on the interest rates and the decline of investment
abroad.
To understand the ﬁnal eﬀects of the change it is helpful to observe panel 5,
which reports the consumption patterns. The panel shows that both countries achieve
higher, relative to the pre-moderation period, levels of consumption. Notice, however,
that countries enjoy the additional consumption in diﬀerent times and for diﬀerent
reasons. US residents face lower income risk in the process, become eﬀectively more
and for securities only.
11There is no long-run growth in the model. If there were, there would not be a reduction in the
capital stock its growth would slow down growth.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a reduction in US volatility
15impatient, so ﬁnd it optimal to enjoy the extra consumption early in time, by bor-
rowing on international markets and slowly running down their capital stock. The
foreign country instead does not face a reduction in its volatility but faces an increase
on the international interest rates so it will ﬁnd optimal to increase saving and enjoy
higher consumption later in time. This inter-temporal redistribution of consumption
requires transfers of resources from the rest of the world to the US in the early periods
and the reverse transfers in the later periods; in equilibrium the early transfers from
the rest of the world to the US show up as US current account deﬁcits while the late
transfers from the US to the rest of the world show up as interest payments on the
accumulated US external imbalance.
Intuition about the ﬁnal outcome can also be gained by thinking of this issue
as a portfolio problem. Residents of both countries are forced to hold their own
risky capital but can trade a risk free asset in zero net supply. It is immediate to
show that when the risky assets have the same characteristics and agents have the
same preferences the only possible long run equilibrium portfolio is the one in which
residents of both countries hold a 0 amount of the bond, i.e. an equilibrium in which
there are no long run imbalances. But when the US domestic assets become less risky
(without changing its expected return) then US residents would like to rebalance their
portfolio in favor of the risky asset. One way they can do so is by going short in the
bond; foreign agents, on the other hand, will be happy to hold additional bonds if
they pay a higher return. So an equilibrium long run portfolio after the US faces
a reduction in volatility would involve the US being short in bonds, the rest of the
world being long on bonds and a real interest rate higher relative to the one in the
symmetric equilibrium. This is exactly what the impulse responses suggest is going
to happen to country portfolios in the long run.
One ﬁnal consideration should be devoted to the eﬀects that the fall in volatility
has on the long run allocation of capital. Panels 3 and 4 show that in the long run
capital falls in both economies but in the US it falls more than in the rest of the world
so that the US share of world capital falls. This last aspect might seem puzzling if
one realizes that after the great moderation the US capital has the same expected
return as the one in the rest of the world but is less risky so one would expect US
share of world capital to rise. The friction that prevents this from happening here is
the lack of diversiﬁcation, that is the fact that all claims to US income are held by US
residents. Since they are the only ones who face the reduction in risk, their desired
16stock of buﬀer assets falls and this is reﬂected in the fall in the US capital stock. We
conjecture that in a model in which agents can also choose between holding domestic
and foreign capital a country speciﬁc reduction in volatility might lead to a surge in
investment in that country and possibly to a larger imbalance.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we check how sensitive our ﬁndings are to changes in parameter values.
The goal is to identify the elements which determine the quantitative importance
of our channel. In particular we examine how the response of external imbalances
to reduction in volatility changes when we change the risk aversion, the limits to
international borrowing, the persistence of international shocks and the extent of the
great moderation.
As our main interest is the size of the external imbalance induced by the great
moderation, for every alternative parametrization we report the size of the net foreign
asset position in 2010, that is 25 years after the onset of the great moderation
Table 3. Sensitivity of US imbalances (% of GDP) to
Risk Aversion, σ
σ = 2 σ = 5 σ = 8
Imbalance 1.8 4.5 5.0
Borrowing Constraint (% of GDP) ¯ b
¯ b = 0 ¯ b = .7 ¯ b = 1 ¯ b = 1.3 ¯ b = ∞
Imbalance 0 3.6 4.5 5.4 −0.2
Persistence of shocks, ρ
ρ = 0.96 ρ = 0.98 ρ = 0.993
Imbalance 2.4 4.5 9.0
Fall in US volatility, λ
λ = 1/4 λ = 1/3 λ = 1/2
Imbalance 3.9 4.5 7.0
The ﬁrst row examines the eﬀect of the risk aversion. Note how at lower level
of risk aversion the external imbalance generated by our mechanism is substantially
smaller. When US agents are less risk averse they reduce less their precautionary
17saving in response to the reduction of risk; as a consequence their desire to consume
early is reduced and so are their external imbalances. The second row highlights the
eﬀect of the tightness of borrowing constraint. The eﬀect of reduction in volatility on
the external imbalance is non linear in the borrowing constraints. Obviously when the
constraints are set to 0 no borrowing is allowed and the response to US imbalances
to changes in volatility is 0. When constraints are initially relaxed some borrowing
is possible. As the constraints relax US consumers can reduce their precautionary
balance more in response to a fall in volatility and so the fall in volatility generates
an imbalance which is larger the looser the constraint is. But as the constraints get
very loose so that they no longer bind in equilibrium, the economy gets arbitrarily
close to full risk sharing (see for example Baxter and Crucini, 1995). In a full risk
sharing equilibrium agents no longer have a precautionary saving motive and so the
reduction in the buﬀer stock of saving and the corresponding long run imbalances do
not emerge in response to a change in volatility
The next row shows that the persistence of the shocks plays an important role.
When shocks are very persistent precautionary motive is strong (as these shocks are
hard to self insure) and thus a reduction in shock volatility causes a large fall in
the precautionary motive and a large imbalance. Notice that when ρ is set to .993
the imbalance reaches about 9% of GDP12. When shocks are less persistent they are
easier to insure so agents hold less of a precautionary buﬀer and as a consequence the
reduction in shock volatility generates a much smaller imbalance.
Finally the last row shows that, not surprisingly, the larger the reduction in volatil-
ity, the larger the imbalance. When US volatility falls by 50% (instead of 33 % as in
the benchmark case) the imbalance reaches 7% of GDP. If instead the reduction in
volatility is only 25% the imbalance falls to 3.9%.
5 Conclusions
We have presented a simple framework to evaluate how much of the current US im-
balance can be explained by the “great moderation”, that is the reduction in business
cycle volatility that started in the mid 1980s and which has aﬀected the US more
12The value of .993 is the highest we can set in our numerical procedure.
18than its partners. We ﬁnd that, ceteris paribus, the great moderation could be re-
sponsible for about 20% of the current US external imbalance. Our study suggests
that the this part of the external imbalance deriving from the great moderation is not
pathological and it does not require any correction but rather the opposite; it arises
so that in a world with limited insurance possibilities agents can share the beneﬁts
of a unilateral reduction in volatility. We want to stress that our conclusion applies
only to a fraction of the current US external imbalances. Understanding the causes
and consequences of the remaining (and large) part of those imbalances remains a
hotly debated and important research question.
Finally our empirical analysis is only limited to the US and our theoretical frame-
work is exceedingly simple as we assume that the only internationally traded asset
is a non contingent bond. In on-going work (Fogli and Perri, 2006) we extend this
study in both directions, by examining the link between macroeconomic volatility and
external imbalances in a large cross section of countries (in emerging countries where
macroeconomic volatility is greater the eﬀects we described might be quantitatively
more important) and by considering a richer asset market structure where we allow
for international diversiﬁcation through stocks.
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